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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
Summer List 5, Sheet 2
Cert. to Mich. Sup . Ct. (Mood y_ ,
Levin, Kavonagh, Ryan; Wil liams,
Coleman, Fitzg e rald, dissenting)

No. 79-1794-CSY
MICRI.GAN
c:. ...__,_
v.

State/Criminal

SUMMERS

Timely

1. Summ a ry. The questions presented are whether police

violated the Fourth Amendment by detaining the occupant of a
house on the - premis e s during the course of an authorized
search, and whether the exclusionary rule should apply in this
circumstance.
2. Facts. On October 10, 1974, a team of Detroit police
,r·

(

officers arrived at 9356 Mansfield to execute a warrant for the
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search of the premises.

As they approached the house, the

officers saw resp leaving.

One of the police asked resp

whether he lived there, and when he replied in the affirmative,
the officer asked to be admitted.

Resp replied that he was

without his keys, but that he would ring for someone inside to
open the door.

One Dwight Calhoun answered the door, but when

the police officer identified himself and attempted to enter
Calhoun quickly shut the door again.

The police then broke

down the door and commenced the search.

-·--------------~
During these events resp had

been standing on the porch.

When police gained entry they required resp to come into the
parlor of the house and remain there until the search was

(

completed.

Petr was not frisked.

When heroin was discovered

hidden in the basement, the police searched resp's person and
-~

discovered a bag of heroin in resp's pocket.

Apparently the

~

sea·rch warrant did not specifically au thor i ze search of per sons
on the premises.
3. Decisions Below. The trial court ordered suppression of
the heroin discovered on petr's person.

The Mich. Ct. App.

affirmed, and the Mich. Sup. Ct. also affirmed.
Terry v. Ohio, 392

u.s.

Relying on

1 (1968); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.

200 (1979); and Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), that
court concluded that "the seizure of [resp} on the porch and ·
his subsequent detention were not, by nature, limited
intrusions permissible under Terry and subsequent cases."
,.

It

reasoned that resp's behavior at no time gave police a basis
for suspecting unlawful activity or fearing for their safety.
Moreover, any basis for detention under Terry was exhausted

--

- 3 ~

.
after brief questioning on the doorstep was completed.
Accordingly, the court held that resp ''was for all practical
purposes arrested without a warrant when he was 'seized' on his
front porch, at a time when the police officers did not have
probable cause to believe that [resp] had committed or was
committing a felony."

Since the heroin was discovered as a

fruit of this detention, the court held that it should be
excluded.
Justice Williams filed a dissent in which two other
justices joined.

The dissenters argued that the proper

approach was to consider whether the detention was "reasonable''
under four criteria: 1) did the case call for a quick decision
by police? 2) did the officers have reasonable belief that the
public peace was in jeopardy? 3) was the intrusion reasonably
related in scope to the perceived need? and 4) was the
officer's personal safety immediately at risk?

Under these

criteria, the dissenters argued that the decision to restrain
resp was reasonable and fit within the Jerry standard.

They

particularly stressed the minimal intrusion involved in "merely
requiring [resp] to cross his own threshold while the warrant
was being executed," and they expressed the view that police
safety was implicated under the circumstances.

Once resp

crossed the threshold, the dissenters took the view that
requiring him to remain in one place until the search was
completed was reasonably necessary to effectuate the search;

{
'-'

and they asserted that police have probable cause to arrest the
owner-occupant of a premises on which there is probable cause
to believe narcotics is present.
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4. Contentions. Petr argues that the Mich. Sup. Ct. erred
in requiring probable cause.

Petr urges

Court to recognize

th~

an exception from the probable cause requirement for detention
of the occupant of a premises

~eing

searched.

Such an

exception assertedly was recognized in United States v.
Micheli, 487 F.2d 429 (CA 1 1973).

Petr relies on the

dissenting opinion for the proposition . that reasonable
suspicion was established in this instance.
Petr next argues a point that was raised in the Mich. Sup.
Ct. but was not fully discussed.

In petr's view, the court

should have held that detention and search of the occupant was
implicitly authorized by the warrant.
r

~rgument,

In support of this

petr cites a number of federal appellate decisions

I

holding that search of articles (such as bags, purses,
briefcases, or the like) held by occupants of a house was
fairly encompassed by a warrant for search of a premises, as
well as certain state cases allowing search of occupants'
persons as a reasonable incident of the warrant.

See,

~'

United States v. Micheli, supra; Walker v. United States, 327
F.2d 597, 600 (CA DC 1963), cert. denied, 377

u.s. 956 (1964);

Clay v. United States, 246 F.2d 298, 305 (CA 5), cert. denied,
255 U.S. 863 (1957); People v. Pugh, 69 Ill. App.2d 312, 217
N.E.2d 557 (1966); People v. Kielczynski, 264 N.E.2d 767 (Ill.
App. 1970); State v. Loudermilk, 494 P.2d 1174 (Kan. 1972)
(alternative theory).
Finally, petr argues ·that resort to the exclusionary rule
in this case would serve no valid purpose.
Tucker, 417

u.s. 433, 450 (1974).

Cf. Michigan v.

The division of the lower

- 5 -

courts itself indicates that the officers' decision to detain
and search was not unreasonable, so that exclusion of the
evidence would have little deterrant effect.
5. Discussion. The present

~ase

is factually

distinguishable from most of the cases on which petr relies
because resp was not within the premises at the time when the
warrant was served, but was forcibly required to enter the
premises and await the outcome of the search.

It was primarily

this initial detention that the court below found to be
unreasonable.

Accordingly, petr's first and second arguments,

even if correct for persons present at the time of search,
would not necessarily resolve this case.
,.-,

(

Nevertheless, it is

possible that this factual difference is not of great legal
significance, as the dissent below concludes.

Nor does Ybarra

v. Illinois fully resolve the issues raised, though it
generally cuts against petr's position; resp was an occupant of
the dwelling to be searched, not simply an invitee, and the
location of the search was a private residence.

Petr does

demonstrate that the lower courts are not in entire agreement
on how to handle occupants of houses that are searched.
recommend calling for a response.
There is no response.
7/8/80

Rahdert

Op in pet.

t

PS 9/11/80

To:
From:
Re:

Mr. Justice Powell
Paul Smith
Michigan v. Summers, No. 79-1794

You asked for a supplemental memo when the response
in this case came in. Resp makes two basic points:

(1) that

the search warrant for his home did not authorize the police
to detain him or to search his person, and (2) that any
independent grounds for searching him personally did not
appear until after he was illegally detained without probable
cause during the house search.

Resp relies on Ybarra v.

Illinois for the pr~~Q~ition that a search warrant for
premises does not

autho~ize

a search of persons found there.

Although Ybarra involved a public bar, and this case involves

..
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resp's residence, resp argues that the Fourth Amendment ~ ~
pertains to "persons, not places," and Yb£irra therefore
controls.

As for any probable cause that was furnished

the discover

~ 5~

b~

of heroin in the basement, resp argues that

this is irrelevant, since the discovery was preceded by an

-

illegal detention of him that was not based on probable

--- ·---------

cause.

-----........._____

The second issue does not merit review by this
Court.

The Michigan courts concluded that this was a

significant detention, not a mere Terry stop, and therefore
required probable cause to arrest.

This was apparently

lacking, although the police did have probable cause,
confirmed in a search warrant, for the search of resp's home.
In any event, the nature of this particular detention, and
the nature of the justification possessed by the police, are
factual issues that will come up in many cases and need not
be reviewed now.
But the first issue--the scope of the authority

--

---~--~------------The state

granted by the search warrant--may be certworthy.

may be correct that a search warrant for premises should
include searches of the owner of the premises, especially
when the object sought (drugs) can be concealed so easily in
clothing.

If so, there is probably a correlative power to

detain the object of such a personal search during the time
that it takes to look around the house itself.

Clearly this

is a far cry from the Ybarra situation where bar patrons were
searched merely because they were in the bar at the wrong

time.

3.

/

Here it is the owner of the house whom the police

searched.
The cases cited by the state (see the original cert
memo) evidence a certain amount of confusion over the
permissible scope of personal searches conducted as adjuncts
to house searches.

It is unclear how the warrant relates to

containers such as briefcases that may or may not be in the
physical possession of their owner at the time of the search.
It is also unclear whether the outcome depends on the status
of the owner of the container as a resident or a visitor.
~United

States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1973).

A third open question involves searches of persons
themselves, at least persons who reside at the location.
United States v. DiRe, 332

u.s.

Government says it would not

581

(1948)

(dictum)

Cf.

("The

conte~~ that, armed with a

search warrant for a residence only, it could search all
persons found in it.").
The state also argues that it would be inappropriate ~
in any event to apply the exclusionary rule here

~ecause

the

~

officers acted in good faith based on a reasonable view of
the law.

But while it is certainly true in some sense that

the officers acted reasonably, it is far from clear how the
retroactivity issue should come out.

If there is one, the

prevailing assumption seems to be that search warrants for

(

buildings do not justify "frisks" of occupants.
Arguing against a grant is the complicating factor

-----

..______--.----------~.--~

·-

that resp was not actually on the premises when the officers

--------~-----....,_____--

~

4.
arrived to serve the warrant.

He was standing in front of

the house, about to leave.

th z: efor~ argued

It

that

his person is not included in the scope of the warrant,
although this is perhaps too technical an argument.

_

In sum, the Court should consider a grant on the

---------------'---~------------is?........__
ue of the
permissible
scope of personal searches based on
_______......._
a search warrant for a given premises. This case would
provide a useful vehicle for working out the consequences of
Ybarra when the police are searching a home and are dealing
with a resident.

A subsidiary question would be the power of

the police to detain a person prior to such a search for a
considerable period of time.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Paul Cane

DATE:

February 24, 1981

RE:

No. 79-1794, Michigan v. Summers

Question Presented
There are three interrelated issues in this case, and
it

is not clear

them.

the Court will have

to address

all of

First, may police detain an individual without probable

cause for
than

that

that

search
search

an

investigatory purposes for a period somewhat longer
permitted
individual

warrant

for

by

Terry

found
the

in

v.
a

house

Ohio?
house

Second,
if

itself?

may

pol ice

they have a
Third,

does

exclusionary rule apply to good faith mistakes of law?

valid
the

2.

Background
This case, although difficult and important, involves
I won't

the application of well-known Fourth Amendment cases.
take your

time recounting them.

facts

the

of

I

case.

do

I wi 11,

so

because,

however,
as

review the

in

many

Fourth

Amendment cases, the legal issues do not become clear until the
factual scenario is firmly in mind.
Detroit police obtained a warrant authorizing them
to search for heroin and other narcotics at a dwelling.

In the

accompanying affidavit, an officer stated that an informant had
purchased heroin from a man named "George" at that address.

As

the

An

pol ice

officer
warrant,

approached,

identified

resp was seen leaving

himself,

displayed

a

copy

the

house.

of

the

and asked resp if he lived in the house.
~---------~~---------------------

that he did.

The officer

told

him

to open

the

search

Resp said
front

door.

~

Resp

said

someone

that

over

he

the

had

left

intercom

his

to

Calhoun appeared at the door.
and

attempted

to

open

the

keys

open

inside

the

and

door.

would

ask

Co-defendant

The officer identified himself
storm

door,

which

was

locked.

Calhoun then slammed the inside door shut.
Police then forced the door open.
fleeing toward a downstairs bedroom.
inside while
all,

another

chased

and

One officer brought resp

finally

about seven persons were found

Calhoun was seen

caught Calhoun.

in the house.

In

They were

assembled in the living room while the officers searched the
house.

The record does not reveal how long the search lasted.

In

basement,

the

police

found

two

plastic

(

bags

containing

3.

Resp was arrested when it became known that resp

narcotics.

owned the house.

A search

incident to this arrest uncovered

heroin in resp's jacket pocket.

It was this heroin that formed

the basis for the charge against him.

Discussion
There

are

unconstitutional:

two

(1)

key

the

incidents

detention

of

resp

arguably
in

the

are

living

The police have three ~

room, and (2) the search of his jacket.
theories,

that

any one of which would permit

the ~

introduction of

~ the initial detention was justified by analogy

heroin.
to Terry

v.

entitled

Ohio.

Police,

to detain resp for

investigation.

Once

the

facing
a

these

period of

heroin

was

circumstances,

were

time sufficient for

legally

found

in

the

basement, pol ice had probable cause to arrest and to conduct
the search incident to that arrest.
entitled

~he

police were

to search resp because he was on the premises that

lawfully were being searched with a valid warrant. ~ even
if

the search was

unconstitutional,

the exclusionary rule

is

inapplicable because police made a "good faith mistake of law."
The Michigan Supreme Court,
matter differently.
that

Dunaway

v.

however,

looked at

the

It rejected the first argument, concluding

New

York

requires

probable

cause

for

any

detention longer than the limited intrusion upheld in Terry v.
Ohio.

Because

subsequent
poisonous

the

search
tree."

initial

incident
It

also

detention
to

arrest

appeared

to

was
was

illegal,
"fruit

reject

the

of

the
the

second

4.
argument, concluding that Ybarra v. Illinois established that a
warrant

to search

persons

found

a

place

therein.

does

The

not

authorize

Michigan

Supreme

the

search of

Court

did

not

address the third argument.
1.

With

respect

conclude that your

p~ on

to

Michigan's

first

argument,

in this case is governed by your

opinion last Term in United States v.

Mendenhall.

You wrote

that "the reasonableness of a stop turns on .
public

interest

scope

of

the

which

the

knowledge

by

intrusion,

law

the
and

enforcement

and experience."

Mendenhall,
\..._....-

served

you

seizure,
(iii)

the

officer

in

at 2.
"in

that,

the

objective

relied

Slip op.

concluded

( i i)

think the police activity

within your
one,

Mendenhall

in this

framework.

light

involved drug crimes.

(ii)

of detaining resp in his home.
~.

<

This

the

nature

and

facts

upon

of

his

the facts
of

all

in
the

Slip op. at 6.

case should
(i)

( i)

light

On

circumstances," that detention was reasonable.
I

I

be analyzed

case,

like

that

The detention consisted only

No questions were asked.

There

was no embarrassment such as that associated with a seizure and
interrogation in a public place.
degree

of

information

that

(iii)

criminal

The police had a high

activity

was

afoot.

A

judge had issued a search warrant for the house, and resp had
acknowledged that he lived there.

The warrant mentioned that a

man named "George" was involved in the drug sales.

----

And other

persons in this house had become frantic at the sight of police
..
-._........-....
officers.
In light of all these circumstances, I think it is

---

,

I /

•.

l'

5.
very likely that the police acted reasonably in detaining resp.
Cf. Mendenhall, slip op. at 6-7.
There is, however, one critical fact missing from the
record that we need to know before passing final

judgment on

the pol ice conduct:

the length of the detention.
The record
~-----------,--~-----shows only that resp was detained while the house search was
conducted.

If

detention

was

that

search

took

several

unreasonable.

One

hours,

arguably

the

disposition,

possible

therefore, is to write an opinion along the lines of Mendenhall
explicating

the

proper

standard

and

then

remanding

for

additional findings of fact to apply that standard.
There is, of course, one substantial obstacle to this
approach:
justices

the
in

opinion

Court

that

case

held

in <u na way

that

nothing

New

v.
less

York.

than

probable

cause was necessary to conduct custodial questioning.

-----------

not

participate.]

It

is

true

that

there

are

at

home.

There,

the suspect was

asked no questions.

But the

[You did

substantial

factual differences between this case and Dunaway.
suspect was taken to the police station.

Six

There, the

Here, he was detained

interrogated.

Here,

police

language of the Court's opinion

very strongly suggests that, except for the limited intrusion
of Terry stops,
detain

an

probable cause

individual.

is required before police may

Dunaway

seems

inconsistent

with

your/

approach in Mendenhall, so it seems unlikely that you can get a
Court for your theory.
2.

I

doubt

there

is

merit

to

Michigan's

second

argument, that a search warrant for a house permits the search

?

6.

of

any

individuals

found

within

it.

This

argument

foreclosed by the Court's opinion in Ybarra v.
Court noted that each occupant of the bar

seems

Illinois.

The

in that case

"was

clothed with constitutional protection against an unreasonable
search or an unreasonable seizure.
warrant,

issued

upon

.

probable

cause,

Although the search
gave

the

officers

authority to search the premises and to search [the individual
named in the warrant], it gave them no authority whatsoever to
invade the constitutional protections possessed individually by
the tavern's customers."
To

be

sure,

there

this case and Ybarra.

are

factual

differences

between

In a public bar, there is no reason to

believe that any one patron is connected with criminal activity
conducted

by

another

patron.

In

a

private

dwelling,

by

contrast, there is a nexus between the occupants that tends to
suggest a common enterprise.
broader

theory.

I

think

But Ybarra stands for a somewhat
that

individuals

possess

fourth

amendment rights that cannot be lost by mere lj>resence at the

Jl rt\ <VMJ

~~ !UAf \..v~"'

site of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant • .~;~ ~ ~.
3.
you.
the
rule

Michigan's third argument is one very familiar to

Assuming arguendo that the detention and search violated
Fourth
should

search

Amendment,
not

in this

apply

Michigan
to

case was

good

argues
faith

conducted

that

the

mistakes

in 1974.

exclusionary
of

law.

The

The officers at

that time had every reason to believe that their behavior was
lawful,

and no deterrent purpose would be served by applying

the exclusionary rule.

7.
The
different

United

argument.

States,

as

amicus,

It suggests

makes

that Dunaway,

a

if

slightly
applicable

here, should not be applied retroactively.

Conclusion
I conclude that the decision of the Michigan Supreme
Court

should

be reversed,

or

at

least

vacated

and

remanded.

But there are several ways you could reach that result.

First,

you could write an opinion along Mendenhall lines

that holds

that

conduct

probable

cause

is
of

reasonable

in

light

with

is

Dunaway,

this

not
all

necessary
the

which

if

pol ice

circumstances.
(without

the

[The

benefit

is

problem
of

your

participation) seems to have rejected this approach in favor of
a

"bright-line" probable cause requirement.]

But

if

this

is

the way you want to proceed, you probably will have to remand

-.

'--

------

because the record does not reveal the length of the detention.
Second,

you could

hold

that the search warrant for

the house authorized the search of all persons found within it.
[The problem ~ s is Ybarr; , .£ i~r~ clear~ r ~

~~ ~ ~~-

this theory.]

Third,
were

illegal,

exclusionary
law.

if

it is held that the detention and search

you

rule

could
is

reverse

inapplicable

on

the

to good

theory
faith

that

mistakes

the
of

Alternatively, as the SG suggests, you could simply hold

that Dunaway is not to be applied retroactively.
I

recommend trying for

limits Dunaway.

a Court under

a

theory that

If that substantive approach fails, and if the
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Supreme Court of Michigan,

[May - , 1981]
delivered the opinion of the Court.
As Detroit police officers were about to execute a warrant
to search a house for narcotics, they encountered respondent
descending the front steps. They requested his assistance in
gaining entry and detained him while they searched the
premises. After finding narcotics in the basement and ascertaining that respondent owned the house, the police arrested
him, searched his person, and found in his coat pocket an
envelope containing 8.5 grams of heroin.1
JusTICE STEVENS

1 The execution of the warra11t is described in greater detail in Justice
Moody's opinion for the Michigan Supreme Court :
" Upon arriving at the named address, Officer Roger Lehman saw the
defendant go out the front door of the house and proceed across t4e
porch and down the steps. When defendant was asked to open the door
he replied that he could not because he left his keys inside, but he could
ring someone over the intercom. Dwight Calhoun came to the door, but
did not admit the police officers. As a result., the officers obtained entrance t o the premises by forcing open the front door. Once admittance
had been gained Officer Lehman instructed Officrr Conant, previously stationed along the side of the house, to bring the defendant, still on the
porch, into the house.
"After t he eight occupants of the hou;;e were detained, a search of the
premises revealed two plastic bag8 of su:;pected narcotics under the bar in
t he basement. After findin g the susperted narcotics in the basement and
upon determining that the defendant was the owner of the house, Officer
Conant formally arrested the defendant fo r violation of t he Controlled

'

.

79-1794-0PINION
MICHIGAN v. SUMMERS

Respondent was charged with possessic:m of the heroin
the heroin as
found on his person. He moved to suppress
'
the product of an illegal search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment/ and the trial judge granted the motion and
quashed the information. That order was affirmed by a
divided panel of ~he Michigan Court of Appeals, 68 Mich.
App. 571, 243 N. W. 2d 689, and by the Mi~higan Supreme
Court over the dissent of three of its justices. 407 Mich.
432, 289 N. W. 2d 226. We granted the State's petition for
U. S. ~, and now reverse~
certiorari, '

I
The dispositive question in this case is whether the initial
detention of respondent violated his constitutional right to
be secure against an unreasonable seizure of his person. The
State attempts to justify the eventual search of respondent's
person by arguing that the authority to search premises ·
granted by the warrant implicitly included the authority to
search persons on . those premises, just as that authority included an authorization to search furniture and containers
in which the particular things described might be concealed.
But as the Michigan Court of Appeals correctly noted, even
Sub~tances Act of 1971. MCL 335.341 (4)(a); MSA 18.1070 (41)(4) (a).
A CUl>todial search conducted by Officer Conant revealed a pla~tic bag containing suspected heroin in the defendant's jacket pocket. It is this
heroin, di::;covered on the person of the defendaut, that forms the basis
of the in<;tant po~::;ession charge." 407 Mich., at 441, 286 N. W. 2d, at
226-227.
2 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their per::;ons, houses, papers,
and effects, again~:>t unrea~onable searche8 and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cau~:~e, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de~:~cribing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." .
'The F()urteenth Amendment requires the several States to secure these
right:::;. 'See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576; Dunaway 'V. New·
for.k.~ 442. U •. S. 200, 207 •.
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if otherwise acceptable, this argument could not justify th'e
initial detention of respondent outside the premises described
in the warrant. See 68 Mich. App., at 578-580, 243 N. W.
2d, at 692-693. If that detention was permissible, there is
110 need to reach the question whether a search warrant for
premises includes the right to search persons found there,
because when the police searched respondent, they had prob- able cause to flo%o. 8 The validity of the search of respondent's person therefore depends 'upon a determination whether
thf! officers had the auth<!rity to require him to re-enter the
house and to remain there while they conducted their search. 4
3 Becaut:le there w<>re ~everal other occupant~ of the house, under Michigan law tlw evidence that narcotics had been foupd in the batoement of
r<>t:lpondent';; hout:le would npparently be int:lufficient to support a conviction. See People v. Davepm·t, 39 Mich. App. 252, 197 N. W. 2d 521
(1972) . The Michigan Court of Appeal, relied on Davenport to conclude
that th<> officer~ did not have probable cause to arretot or search retopondent
evPn though he wa~ the owner of a house in w\lich contraband was found .
68 Mich. App., at 580-582, 243 N. W. 2d, at 692-693. .Judge Ba~;hara,
di~;toenting in the Court of Appeal~, (i Mich. App., at 585, 243 N . W. 2d,
at 695, and the three di~;toenting ju~;tices of the Michigau Supreme Court,
407 Mich., at 450, 463--4(i4, 2~6 N. W. 2d, at 231 1 237, pointed out that
Davenport, which eoucerns the proof nece~to<try to support a conviction,
i~ uot di~;po~itive of the 4Uei:ition whether the police had probable cause to
arrest . See Brinegar' · United States, 383 U.S. HiO, 174-176. Regardles;, of whether the police had probable eause to arrest respondent under
Michigan law, probable c·ause within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment i~ not at j):!):!UE' lwre. Re~pondent doe~ not clmllenge the conclu~ion
that the evidence found iu hi;; home establi~hed probable cause to arret:lt
him . See Bri<>f for Re~poudent 17.
d The "seizure" i~:>~ue in this case bhould uot be confu~ed with the
"s<>arch " i~:>:me preHf'nted in Yba1'1'a v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85. In Ybarra
the poliee executing 1~ !<earch warrant for a public tavern detained and
searched all of the cu~:>tomers who happen<>d to be pre~:><>nt. No question
concerning the legitimary of the detention was rni~ed . Hather, the Court
concludNI that the ~:>earch of YLarra was invalid becau~;e the police had
no rea~:>on to believe he had any ~pecial connection with the premi~:>es, and
thf' police had llO other basis for suspecting that he was armed or in
possession of contraband. See 444 U. S., at 90-93. In this case, only th~
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II

nesp9n?ent'~n,

In assessing the validity of
we note
first that it constituted a "seizupe'~ ·within the meaning of the
Fourth Amenqment. 5 The State ~oes not contend otherwise)
and the record demonstrates that 11espondent was not free to
leave the premises while the officers were searching his home;
It is also clear that respondent waEj not formally arrested
until after the search was completed, The dispute therefore
involves only the constitutionality of a pre-arrest "seizure'~
which was admittedly unsupported by probable cause.
In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, the Court reaffirmed the general rule that an official seizure of the person
must be supported by probable cause, even if no formal arrest is made. In that case police officers located a murder
suspect at a neighbor's house, took him into custody and
transported him to the police station, where interrogation
ultimately produced a confession. Because the suspect was
not arrested until after he had confessed, and because he
presumably would have been set free if probable cause had
not been established during his questioning, the State argued
that the pre-arrest detention should not be equated with an
arrest and should be upheld as "reasonable" in view of the
serious character of the crime and the fact that the police
had an articulable basis for suspecting that Dunaway was
involved. !d., at 207. The Court firmly rejected the State's
argument, noting that "the detentiou of petitioner was in
detenti011 i~ at i;;sue. The police knew reopouclent lived in the hou;;e, and
they did not ;;earrh him until after they had probable cau;;e to arrest and
had done i:'O.
5 " It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures' of
person~:> which do not eventuate· in a trip to the ;;tation hou;;e and protsecution for crime-' arrest~' in traditional terminology. It must be recog!lizcd that whenever a policr officer acco::<tl:l an individual and re;;trains hi$
freedom to walk away, he lm::, ';;eized' that per;;on." Terry v. Ohio, · 392:

u. s. 1, 16.

-~J
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important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest."
!d. , at 212.n We stated:
"Indeed, any 'exception' that could cover a seizure as
intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow
the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are
'reasonable' only if based on probable cause.
"The central importance of the probable-cause requirement to the protection of a citizen's privacy afforded by the Fourth Amendment's gua.rantees cannot
be compromised in this fashion. 'The requirement of
probable cause has roots that are deep in our history.'
Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 100 (1959). Hostility to seizures based on mere suspicion was a prime
motivation for the adoption of the Fourth Amendment,
and decisions immediately after its adoption affirmed that
'common rumor or report, suspicion , or even "strong reason to suspect" was not a.d equate to support a warrant
for a.rrest.' !d., at 101 (footnotes omitted). The famil iar threshold standard of probable cause for Fourth
Amendment seizures reflects the benefit of extensive experience accommodating the factors relevant to the 'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and
provides the relative simplicity and clarity necessary to
the implementation of a workable rule. See Brinegar
v. United States, [338 U. S. , at 175-176] ." I d., at 213.
Although we refused in Dunaway to find an exception that
would swallow the general rule. our opinion recognized that
some seizures significantly less intrusive than an a.rrest have
withstood scrutiny under the reasonableness standard embodied in the Fourth Amendment. In these cases the intru6

The Court not ed t hat Dunaway was "taken from a neighbor's home
to a police car , tran:>ported to a police station, and placed in an interrogation room ." He was not informed that !Je was free to leave, he would
not have been free to !rave and would have bren physically restrained had
he attempted lo do so. 442 U. S,, at 212.
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sion on the citizen's priv~cy "was se much less severe" than
that involved in a traditional arrest that "the opposing interests in crime prevention and detection and in the police
pfficer's safety" could support the seizure as reasonable. ld.,
at 209.
In the first such case, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1. the Court
recognized the narrow authority of police officers who suspect criminal activity to make limited intrusions on an individual's personal security based on les~ than probable cause.
'l'he Court approved a "frisk" for weapons as a justifiable
response to an officer's reasonable belief that he was dealing
with a possibly armed and dangerous suspect. 7 In the second such case, Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143. the Court
relied on 'Perry to hold that an officer could forcibly stop a
suspect to investigate an informant's tip that the suspect
was armed and carrying narcotics. 8 And in United States v.
Briyoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, the Court held that the special
enforcement problems confronted by roving Border Patrol
agen~s, though not sufficient to justify random stops of vehiln upholding the "fritik" employed by the officer in that case, the
Court assumed, witj10ut explicitly stating, that the Fourth Amendment
dorl:l not prohibit forcible stop~; when the officer has a reasonable l:lttl>picion
that, a crime has been or is being committed. See id., at 32-33 (Harlan,
J., concurring). !d., at 34 (WHI'l'E, J., concurring). In Adams v.
Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146, the Court made explicit what was implicit
in 'l'e1"ry :
'
7

" A brief stop of a sul:lpicious individual, in order to determine his identity
or to maintain the statuti que. momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the fact~ known to the officer at
the time."
See also United States v. B1"ignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. !:!73; United States v.

Co1"tez, 8

U. S. - .

The Court noted that the informant';; tip was insufficient to justify an
arrest or search based on probable cau~Se under Spinelli v. United f3tates,
,393 U. S. 410, and Aguilar v. Texas, 37i5 U. S. 108, but, the information
"carried enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer's forcible stop.
'or Williams." 407 U.S., at H7.
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cles near the Mexican border to question their occupants
about their citizenship, id., at 882-884, 9 were adequate to
support vehicle stops based on the agents' awareness of specific articulable facts indicating that the vehicle contained
illegal aliens. The Court reasoned that the difficulty in pa. .
trolling the long Mexican border and the interest in controlling
the influx of illegal aliens justified the limited intrusion,
usually lasting no more than a minute, involved in the stop.
ld., at 878-880. 10 See alEo United States v. Cortez, U.S.-.
These cases recognize that some seizures admittedly covered by the Fourth Amendment constitute such limited intrusious on the personal security of those detained and are
justified by such substantial law enforcement interests that
they may be made on less than probable cause, so Ion~ as
police have an articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity. In these cases, as in Dunawa11, the Court was applying the ultimate standard of reasonableness embodied in the
u In several ca~es, the Court has concluded that the absence of any
articulilble facts available to the officer rendered a detention unrea~on
ab'e. In Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U. S. 648, 663, the Court held that
police could not make random stops of vehicles in order to cheek driven;
licPnSt'li and vehiclt' rrgistrntiom; in the absence of "articulable and reasonable sulipicion" thnt thP motorist was unlicensed or the cnr unregistereJ.
In Brown v. Texas . 443 U . S. 47, we held that a statute requiring individuals to identify them!'elve;; wall uncon;;titutional as applied because the
police did not have any reasonable su;;picion that the petitioner had committed or was committing a crime. Finally, in Ybarra v. Illinois, supra, we
held that police executing a search warrant at a tavern could not invoke
Terry to friEk a patron unle;;~ the officers had individualized suspicion
that the patron might be armed or dangerous.
1 0 The detention approved in Brignoni-Ponce did not encompu:::s a search
of the vehicle. The Court had held in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U. S. 266, thnt such a ~enrch mu;;t be ;;upported by probable cause.
ln United States v. Martinez-Fuertt'. 428 U. S. 543, the Court held that
slop~ at permanent checkpoints involved even less intrusion to a motorist
t hnn the detention bv th{• roving patrol. aJ1(1 thus a stop at Sll<'h a check:...
point need not even be hasrd Qll any individualized su:;piclanc.
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Fourth Amendment. 11 They are consistent with the general
rulE;) that every arrest, and every seizUJle having the essential
attributes of a formal arrest, is unreasonable unless it is
supported by probable cause. But they demonstrate that
the exception for limited intrusions that may be justified '
by special law enforcement interests is not confined to the
momentary, on-the-street detention accompanied by a frisk
for weapons involved in Terry and Adams. 1 ~ Therefore, in
In his opinion for the Court in Teh·y, Chief Justice Warren identified
"the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment" a~ "the rea:sonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a
dtizen's personal security." 392 U. 8., at 19. Before aualyzing the specific stop and frisk involved in that case, he stated:
"The scheme of ·the Fourth Amendment becomer:; meaningful only when it
is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing
the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a
judge who must evaluate the reasonablene~:;S of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And in making that assesr:;ment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure
or the search 'warrant a man of rea:sonable caution in the belief' that the
action taken was appropriate? Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S.
lil2 (1925); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96-97 (1964)." 392 U. 8., at 2122 (footnotes omitted).
1
~ Jm;'1'1CE WRITE, concurring in Dunaway, noted that Terry is not
"an almost unique exception to a hard-and-fast standard of probable
cause." Rather, "the key principle of the Fourth Amendment is reasonablene;;s-the balancing of competing intere:;t:s." 442 U. 8., al 219
(WHrrE, J ., concurring). If the purpo:;e underlying a 'Perry stop-inve:;tigating possible criminal activity-i:s to be served, the police must
under certain circumstances be able to detain the individual for longer
than the brief time period involved in Terry und Adams. As one commentator observed:
"It is clear that there are ~everal investigative techniqJ.les which may be
utilized effectively in the course of u Terry-type ::;top. The most common
i::; interrogation, which may include both a request for identification and
inquiry concerning the su s pi ciou ~:> conduct of the person detained. Sometimes the officer will communicate with others, eithPr police or private
citizen::;, in an effort to verify the explanation tendered or to confirm lh&
11
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9rder to decide whether this case is controlled by the general
.rule, it is necessary to examine both the character of th~
QfficiaJ ~utru~ion and its justificativn.

III
Of prime importance in assessing the intrusion is the fact
that the police had obtained a warrant to search responde~t's
house for contraband. A neutral and detached magistrate
had found probable cause to believe that the law was being
violated in that house and had authorized a substantial invasion of the privacy of the petsons who resided there. 'The
detention of one of the residents while the premises were
searched, although admittedly a significant restraint on hi~
liberty. was surely less intrusive than the search itself.1 8
Indeed, we may safely assume that most citizens-unless they
intend flight to avoid arrest-would elect to remain in order
to observe the search of their possessions. Furthermore, the
type of detention imposed here is not likely to be exploited by
the officer or unduly prolonged in order to gain more information, because the information the officers seek normally will be
identification or determine whether a person of that identity is otherwise
wanted. Or, the suspect may be detained while it is determined if in fact
an offense has occurred in the area, a process which might involve checking
certain premises, locating and examining objects abandoned by the suspect,
or talking with other people. If it is known that an offense has occurred
in the area, the suspect may be viewed by witnesses to the crime. There
is no rea::;on to conclude that any investigative methods of the type just
listed are inherently objectionable; they might cast doubt upon the
reasonableness of the detention , however, if their use makes the period of
detention unduly long or involves moving the suspect to another locale."
3 W. LaFave, Searc4 and Seizure§ 9.2, pp. 36-37 (1978).
1 3 "As the Court reiterated just a few years ago, the 'physical entry of
the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment i::; directed.' United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S.
297, 313. And we have long adhered to the view that the warrant procedure minimizes the danger of needless intrusion:; of that sort." Payton v.
Ne·w York~ 4:45 U.S. 573, 581h586.
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obtained through the search and not through the detention. 14
Moreover, because the detention in this case was in respondent's own residence, it could add only minimally to the public
stigma associated with the search itself and would involve
neither the inconvenience nor the inqignity associated with a
compelled visit to the police station.~ In sharp' contr~tst to
the custodial interrogation in Dunaway, the detention of this
respondent was "substantially less intrusive" than an arrest.
442 U. S., at 210. 16
In assessing the justification for the detention of an occupant of premises being searched for contraband pursuant
to a valid warrant, both the law enforcement interest and
the nature of the "articulable facts" supporting the detention
are relevant. Most obvious is the legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found. Less obvious, but sometimes of
greater importance, is the interest in minimizing the risk of
harm to the officers. Although no special qanger to the
police is suggested by the evidence ~n this record, the execution of a. warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts·
to conceal or destroy evidence. The risk of harm to both the·
police and the occupants is minimized if the officers ro•·tinPly
exr· rcise unquestioned command of the situation. Cf. 2 W.
5

Professor LaFave ha~ noted that the reasonableness of a detention
may bc.> dcte··mined in part by " fw -lhether the police are diligently pur:miPg 11 mean~ of irn·estigation which it> likely to resnl --e the matter on e
way or nnothrr rrry ~oon ... " 0 W. LnFnve, Se:tr~h aPd Seizure § 9.2, p.
14

40 (1978) .

J\IorE'ove:>r, unlike the s~izurE' in Du.,away, which was designed to pro\'idr an opportunity for inte ~ rogation and did lead to Dunnway's cC1nfesbion , the ~rizwe in this rnsE' is rot likPiy to haw roerri\·e aspects likely to
jndu "e >'elf- incrimination.
10 WP do not Yi:-w the fart that rP~pnndc.>nt wns JeaYing his house when
the rffi " rr~ nr ived lo bE' of roPstitutional signifiranre. Th c.> oeizurr of
r~spond0nt on the sidrwalk outside was no more intrusive than the de--!t~ntiQn of t.h nse re~id_ents of the ltou ~r that the police found inl'ide.
15

1'9- 1794--:0PINION
MICHIGAN v, SUMMERS

H

LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.9, pp. 150-151 (1978),
Finally, the orderly completion of the search may be
facilitated if the occupants of the premises are pre€ent.
Their self-interest may induce them to dpen locked doors or
locked containers to avoid the use of force that is not only
da.maginp: to property but may also delay the completion of
the task at hand.
It is also appropriate to consider the nature of the articula.ble and individualized suspicion on which the police base
the detention of the occupant of a home subject to a search
warrant. We have already noted that the detention represents only an incremental intrusion on persona.! liberty when
the sea.rch of a home has been authorized by a valid warrant.
The f'xistence of a search warrant, however, also orovides an
objective justifiration for the detention. A judicial officer
has determineu that police have probable catJse to believe
that someone in the home is committing a crime. . Thus a
neutral magistrate rather than an officer iq the field has made
the critical determination that the police should be given a
special a.''thorization to thruRt themselves into the priva{ly
of p, hom3. 17 The connection of an occupant to that home
17

Justice Jarkson recognize(} the :oignificance of this determination in

Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14:
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealou~ officers, is not that it deniel,'! law epforcement the support of the
USI.ja] inferences which rea;;onable men draw from evidence. Its protection
con~ibts in requiring that those inference~ be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate in~tead of bejng judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any a~umption that
evidence sufficient tp support a magi~trate':,; di~intere~:~ted determination
to i~sue a search warrant will justify the officers ill making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the
people's homes ~Secure only in the discretion of police officers. Crime,
even in the privacy of one's own quarter;; is, of cour;;e, of grave concern
to society, and the law allows such crime to be reuched on proper showing.
The right of olficer~; to thru~;t themselves into a home is al:;o a grave couce~, not only to the individual hut to a society which chooses to dweU
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gives the police Qfficer an easily identifiable and certa.in basis
for determining that suspicion of c~imin11l ~:~-ctivity justifies a
detention of that occupant.
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, we held th~tt police
officers may not enter a private residenc~ to make a routine
felony arrest without first obtaining a warrant. In that c&se
we rejected the suggestion that only a search warrant could
adequately protect the privacy interests at sta.ke, noting that
the distinction between a search warrant and an arrest warrant was far less significant than the interposit-ion of the
magistrate's determination of probable cause between the
zealour. officer and the citizen:
"It is true that an arrest warrant requirement may
afford less protection than a sea.rch warrant requirement,
but it will suffice to interpose the magistrate's determination of probable ca.Pse between the zealous officer and
the citizen. If there is sufficient evidence of a citizen's
particioation in a felony to pen;;nade a judicial officer
th~tt his arrest is justified, it is constitutionally rea~on
able to reonire him to ooen his doors to the officers of
the law. Thus, f0r Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause imolicitly carries
with it the limited authority to ent'-'r a dwelling in which
the suspect lives when there is ref!son to believe the suspect is within." 445 U. S. , at 602-603.

.

That holding is relevant today. If the evidence that a citizen's res:d .,nre is harboring colltraband is sufficient to persuade p, judicial offirer tha.t an invasion of the citizen's
privary is jPstifi"d, it is constitutionallv reasonable to require
that. citizen to remain while officers of the law execute a valid
in reasonablP
priyar:v must
derided by a
ment ·agent ."

security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of
rea~onably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be·
judicial officer, not by u policeman or government enforce:..
(Footnote~; omitteCl.)
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warrant to search his hotne. 18 Thus, for Fourth Amend ..
ment purposes, we hold thftt a warrant to search for contraband 19 foun~ed on probable cause implicitly carries with it
the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises
while a proper search is conducted. 2Q
Because it was lawf~l to require respondent to re-enter and
to remain in the house until evidence establishing p~obable
cause to arrest him was found, his "rrest and the search incident thereto were constitutionfl,lly permissible. The judgment of the Supreme Court · of Michigan must therefore be
I
reversed.
.
It is so ordered.

In refu~ing to approve seizures based on less than probable cause,
the Dunaway court declined to adopt a "multifactor balancing te.st of
'reasonable police conduct under t!1e circumstances' to cover all seizur~
that do not amount to technical arrests." The Court noted:
"The protections intended by the Framers could all too easily dit~appear
in the consideration and balancing of the multifarious circumstances presented by different cases, especially when that balancing may he done in
the first instance by police cfficel'~> engaged in the 'often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.'" 442 U. S., at 213.
As JUti'l'ICE WHJ'I'E noted in his concurrence in Dunaway, if police are
to have workable rules , the balancing of the competing inter~ts inherent
in the Terry principle "must in huge part be done on a categorical basisnot in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual police officer~>." 442
U. S., at 219-220 (WHITE, J., concurring). The rule we adopt today
does not (lppend upon such an ad hoc determination, bzcause the officer
i~ not required to evaluate either the quantum of proof justifying detention
or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure.
19 We do not decide whether the same rffiult would be justified if the
search warrant merely authorized a search for evidence. Cf. Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U. S. 547, 560. See also id., at 581 (S'l'EVENA J.,
dissenting).
20
Although special circumstances, or possibly a prolonged detention,
might lead to a different conclusion in an unusual ca~e, we are persuaded
that thi~ routine detention of rffiidents of a house while it was being
searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant is not such a case.
18
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 18, 1981

Re:

79-1794 - Michigan v . Summers

Dear John:
In due course I expect to circulate
a dissenting opinion.
Sincerely yours ,

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

~u:prtlltt Qftturlttf tlrt ~tt~ ~taft.&'
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C HAM BERS OF

JUSTI C E JOHN PAUL S T E VENS

May 19, 1981

Re:

79-1794 -Michigan v. Summers

Dear Bill:
Thank you for your letter commenting on Part III
of my proposed opinion.
I would agree, of course, that
either consent or exigent circumstances might justify
the detention of the occupants of a house that is being
searched without a warrant, but in this case I do not
believe either of those justifications would be
sufficient. Since the result in other cases may well
turn on the specific facts, I am inclined to think it
would be unwise to
to gr~~t when the
justification would e adequate and when not. For
example, if a homeowner answers the door and consents
to an entry by the police, would it necessarily follow
that they could detain other residents of the house
while they conducted a search within the limits to
Which the consent applied? Or, if they were in hot
pursuit of a fleeing felon who took refuge in a house,
is it clear that they could detain other occupants who
might have no connection with that person? In sum, I
would rather wait for cases of that kind before trying
to say too much about either exigent circumstances or
consent.

til

Respectfully,

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

'I·

.§u.prtntt <!faurl af t~t ~tb .§tattg

1!icurfrittghm. ~· <q. 2.0,?J!..;l

May 19, 1981
Re:

No. 79-1794

Michigan v. Summers

Dear John:
I am certainly in general agreement with the printed
opinion you circulated on May 18th, and my concerns
reflect more those of "omission" than "commission". In
Part III of your opinion, beginning on page 9, although
you do not make it in terms the exclusive basis for
detaining the occupant of the premises, I think that
part could be read as virtuallt requiring a warrant issued
b~ru tr ~ " as t e necessary b as1s fo""r any
detent1on.
It seems to me that exigent circumstances,
which have always been an excepti~n ttr ~~ requirement and some of which are mentioned in that part of your
opinion, as well as consent of the type found in Schneckloth
v. Bustamante, 412 U.~ 8 (1972), would each justify
the pollee conduct here.
It may be that I am simply misinterpreting Part III of your opinion, but from my first
reading of it it seems to be an unduly narrow justification
of the police authority to temporarily "freeze" the
status quo under the circumstances present here.
Sincerely~

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

.®npttmt <!fanrl cf flrr ~trb- ,§tatt,a'J)!ra.s-Irittghtn, ~. <!):. 21lbiJ!.~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 20, 1981

Re:

79-1794 - Michigan v. Summers

Dear Lewis:
Pursuant to our conversation, which was prompted
by Bill Rehnquist's letter and my response, I should
think the addition of the following footnote on page 10
should take care of the problem:
"17/ The fact that our holding today does not
rest on any special circumstances does not, of
course, preclude the possibility that comparable
police conduct may be justified by exigent
circumstances in a proper case. No such question,
however, is presented by this case."
Respectfully,

fL
Justice Powell
cc:

Justice Rehnquist
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,Snprmu <lfllllrl qf tlr:t ~u~ .Sbrlts
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE J OHN PAUL STEVENS

May 20, 1981

Re:

79-1794 -Michigan v. Summers

Dear Lewis:
Pursuant to our conversation, which was prompted
by Bill Rehnquist's letter and my response, I should
think the addition of the following footnote on page 10
should take care of the problem:
"17/ The fact that our holding today does not
rest on any special circumstances does not, of
course, preclude the possibility that comparable
police conduct may be justified by exigent
circumstances in a proper case. No such question,
however, is presented by this case."
Respectfully,

/l

Justice Powell
cc:

Justice Rehnquist

May 20, 1981

79-1794 Michigan v. Summers

John:
Please join
Sincerely,

Justi:ce Stevens
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

.-
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.:§u:pumt (Q:curt trf tltt ~tittb ~tatt.a'
~~.~.(Q:. 20~~~
CHAMBERS OF

JU S TI CE BYR ON R . WHITE

May ·21, 19 81

Re:

79-1794 - Michigan v. Summers

Dear John,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
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jrfasJrtngt01t,1£1. ~- 20.?'-l.;l
CHAM BERS OF"

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . RE HNQUIST

May 21, 1981
Re:

No. 79-1794

Michigan v. Summers

Dear John:
Ple a se join me in your opinion of the Court.
Sincerely,

~
Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

t4t 1!fuittb ~taf:tg
._uqtnghtn., ~. <q. 2ll.;t'l>~

~ttp"rtntl <!fttttttll£

CHAMBERS Of"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 3, 1981

79-1794, Michiqan v. Summers

Dear John:

I join.

Regards,

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE

w ....

.J. BRENNAN, .JR.

RE:

/

June 11, 1981

No.79-l794 Michigan v. Summers

Dear Potter:
Please join me.

Sincerely,

Justice Stewart
cc: The Conference
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